Hurtgen Forest battle: Costly,
unproductive, ill-advised

Chris Christensen in France, 1945

After about 50 plus days of fighting in the horrible weather of the Bulge we had finally shoved Jerry back to his original line of departure of Dec. 16. Here we would be entering the dreaded Seigfried Line and into Germany itself where we would be relieved and trucked back to the town of Salm Chateau, Belgium, where for the next couple of days we would be cleaning our equipment and ourselves which was in deplorable condition. Also for the first time while in combat we got a few replacements. In my platoon, I think I received about 6 or 8 men. These were a welcome addition, but you also knew the higher brass had something else in mind for you.

Sure enough on Feb. 7 we loaded on trucks and moved over to what I now know as the Hurtgen Forest. This to us appeared to be a continuation of the Bulge, but was actually on the German- Belgian border and a part of the Rhineland Campaign.

This move went painfully slow and we did not arrive at our destination until late afternoon. After unloading, we started down this trail into the forest. We had only gone a short distance when we stopped and got the order to halt and dig in. This was as far as we would be going that day. As usual, we would set up a defense for the night and I started checking to make sure this was being done. All this was taking time and when I finally got dug in it was dark. After finishing, I lay down in this shallow trench and stretched out. I could not have been in there but a few moments before I caught a whiff of this horrible odor. There was no mistaking this smell. I had dug in on a decaying corpse. Needless to say I was the one to vacate the hole. The rest of this sleepless night I spent sitting on the ground leaning against a tree. I do remember while digging the lower end of the trench it was much easier going. I had probably disturbed the earth there and this was where the gases were coming from.

As soon as it got light the next morning we moved out. While proceeding down this trail I noticed most of the snow had melted and we were now plowing through a muddy mess. We were entering an area where some terrific fighting had taken place. First indication of this was when we began to notice the shell holes plus the havoc the artillery had done to the trees. These in places looked as if someone had taken a giant scythe and mowed them down.

Proceeding farther down the trail things got progressively worse. The trees I mentioned being cut down with a scythe, here they had been destroyed with a vengeance. Most had been blown to ribbons. Also scattered among this debris were countless bodies or parts of them. By their shoulder patch “The Red Keystone” you knew they were remnants of the 28th Inf. Div. The sickening part was they had laid there all winter covered in a blanket of snow.

Just a short distance further in, we came to what had been an aid station. No way can I describe this in detail. Hundreds of bodies stacked like cordwood along with heaps of amputated arms and legs.

Many of the bodies were still laying on litters. These were probably being attended to when Jerry unleashed a massive artillery barrage, wiping out this aid station. By the amount of shell holes and destruction centered in this one area, you can be assured this was no accident, he must have had direct observation. Some of these bodies were just beginning to appear through the melting snow and a more gruesome sight you couldn’t imagine.

On this trail until now we had been enclosed in the forest on both sides. All at once we approached a break in the trees on the left side. Here we got a good view of the valley floor below which was loaded with wrecks of burnt out U.S. tanks. I would say there were well over a hundred in this small area. You can’t say a tank battle had taken place here as I did not see one destroyed Kraut Panzer tank. The Krauts were probably setting back with their 88’s and artillery and annihilated them. About all of these tanks had burned, so it would be safe to assume the charred bodies of the crews were still inside.

On Feb. 9 we reached the village of Schmidt. What I really saw was just a pile of rubble. The town had been flattened. Here a terrific battle must have have taken place. There were bodies strewn everywhere. Some of these, tanks had run over and flattened. Charred bodies hanging out of turrets where the crews had tried to bail out of these burning hulls. You could see an arm or leg laying around, but no body it had been attached to. Had some wild animal been dragging this off to feast on later? You would shake your head and wonder is this Armageddon? Has the civilized world gone mad?

Passing through Schmidt, the regiment continued on to its final objective, the ground overlooking the Roer River.

At the same time the 78th Div. had moved up on our flank while proceeding on down to the Schwammenauel Dam. Their objective is to capture the dam and the power house works intact. This was not to be. The Germans while withdrawing, had destroyed all the control valves, thus releasing the water and flooding the valley.

My questions are, was all this for naught? Was all this just to satisfy some top brass' ego? The slaughter of lives was useless, not one thing was accomplished. Will any of this go down in history and how will it be described? Our supreme commander, Eisenhower, in his “Crusade in Europe” devotes two full sentences to this campaign. For the men who fought and died here, I would imagine they would view it a little different. Why couldn’t this action be abandoned? Was it that the U.S. high brass prestige was at stake? This 50-square-mile area costing 30,000 dead and wounded, equates out to 600 G.I’s per square mile. Mighty costly real estate.

A short time back I came upon a book about the Hurtgen Forest which answered a lot of questions that had bothered me for years. This book “The Battle of Hurtgen Forest" by Charles Whiting writes about 30,000 American G.I’s being killed or wounded in this longest battle that should not have been fought. He explains where from Sept. '44 to Feb. '45 eight U.S. Infantry and two U.S. Armored Divisions were thrown into the green hell of the Hurtgen's 50 square miles of thick wooded hills loaded with Germans. This forest the G.I’s called the “Death Factory.” Briefly what I have learned I will attempt to pass on.

This whole brain child can be contributed to Gen. Joe Collins, commander of the VII Corp 1st Army. After convincing his Army Commander, Gen. Hodges that his right flank needed to be secured, he was given permission to send in a reconnaissance. This would soon develop into a large scale attack.

On Sept 13th, the 9th Infantry Division was given the honor of starting this fiasco. When they were relieved, their casualties were enormous. For a gain of exactly 3000 yards on a three mile front, the 9th had suffered 3,836 casualties. This meant that a man had been killed or wounded for every square yard of German soil gained. Whiting writes that in reality this was not the true figure as the top brass was cooking the books. The 60th Inf. Reg., for example, had suffered an almost 100% turnover in combat personnel, a truly appalling figure.

The next division to enter this death factory was the 28th Infantry Division with one combat command from the 5th Armored Div. attached. Their line of attack was the same as the ill-fated 9th. Starting with Germeter, Vossenack across the Kall River Gorge and finally to Schmidt. There was one difference, part of the attack would be up the Kall trail which was virtually a cart track. Here the 28th losses were 6,184 casualties or about 45% of the division strength. The rifle companies suffered the worst, with about a 90% casualty rate.

The same would continue every couple of weeks, a new division being committed and being chewed up. The casualty rate was becoming alarming. About now the top brass had changed its objective. The protection of Collin’s flank probably did not justify the losses being sustained. The objective now was the Schwammenauel Dam. This dam controlled the Roer River flood waters. Until now, none of this had been mentioned.

The top brass by now were getting desperate, a general had been relieved of his command, as were Colonels and on down the line. Replacements were steadily being shoved into combat. It was said if one of these lasted three days, he would be considered a veteran.

What I can’t understand is a campaign of this magnitude and so little being written about it. Both historian and writer Stephan Ambrose and the noted Charles MacDonald call the whole operation stupid and ill-advised. General Gavin, commander of the 82nd Airborne Division said, Quote: "For us the Hurtgen was one of the most costly, most unproductive and most ill-advised battles our army has ever fought."

Incidentally, he was the only general who protested this waste. On Feb 19th, we were relieved by the 9th Infantry Division and returned to Suippes, France. This would be the last of the winter war for the 505.

What I had witnessed there in the Hurtgen would leave a lasting impression. This place must have been the closest to hell one could get without entering the gates, but what I can’t understand is how these divisions left their fallen troops behind. This is completely unacceptable.

W.T. Christensen